Introduction
Accounting information linked to share price data is an essential ingredient of empirical research in finance. For example, many stylized facts in the literature on cross-sectional return predictability involve accounting information, such as book-tomarket or earnings-to-price ratios. In response to this empirical evidence on predictability researchers develop new theories and models of pricing in equity markets (e.g. Fama and French 1993 , Daniel and Titman 1997 , Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998 , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998 , Hong and Stein 1999 .
How can we test these empirically motivated models? There is certainly a problem when the same data set is used to motivate and to test a model (Merton 1987, Lo and MacKinlay 1990) . One way to at least partially address this problem is to test models with non-US data, as in French (1998), or Daniel, Titman, and Wei (2001) . However, international data usually comes with its own problems. First, accounting data for non-US markets is usually available only for a relatively short time-series, or only for a relatively small cross-section of firms. Studies on stock return predictability, for example, are likely to suffer from this problem. Second, the quality of non-US data sets tends to be inferior. While there have been some concerns about selection and survivor biases in the US COMPUSTAT database, 1 this problem is likely to be worse in non-US datasets. This paper introduces a new database that addresses some of these problems. It provides essential balance sheet information for all UK firms ever listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1953-1999 at annual frequency. I construct the data set by merging two previously existing databases, Datastream and the Cambridge/DTI database, and by handcollecting balance sheets for all remaining firms not covered in these sources. In total, the data set covers close to 100,000 firm-years. It is fully crossreferenced to the London Share Price Database (LSPD) 2 , which covers the period since 1955. Hence, this is a rich new data source that can be used to test theories on non-US data. Furthermore, since it covers virtually the whole population of listed firms at any point in time between 1953 and 1999, selection bias is absent by construction. This is a distinguishing feature of this new data set compared to other international data sources.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to introduce this database to a wider audience and to provide information on its characteristics. I show that the new database misses only about 7% of the underlying population of listed stocks. Much of it can be traced to new listings. Commonly, accounting data is not available for the time before the initial listing. In some cases the database also misses firms that are about to delist. However, a look-ahead bias can be avoided by substituting lagged accounting information for missing years of data. Hence, except for the tendency to miss newly listed firms, the database is essentially free of selection bias. With respect to selection bias, the new database is superior to the US COMPUSTAT database, which misses a far greater share of firms in earlier decades.
Second, given that the new database covers virtually the whole underlying population, I also evaluate the selection biases inherent in previously existing databases. I find that the existing ones systematically miss small firms and high bookto-market stocks. Furthermore, returns, for example on an equal-weighted index, are biased downwards. Sample standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis of returns are understated, which closely mirrors the simulation evidence in Kothari, Sabino and Zach (2001) , where extreme observations are truncated deliberately. This suggests that existing databases miss extreme performers in both tails of the return distribution.
The effect is strongest in the 1970's when Datastream exhibits survivor bias, suggesting that at least part of it is due to this form of ex-post selection bias. Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2001) demonstrate that there are research designs in which such truncation of extreme observations can create spurious evidence of predictability. The evidence in this paper complements their findings by showing that this truncation is a real feature of existing accounting data sets.
It is important to note that these problems are unlikely to be unique to the UK data. Not much is known about the firms missed by COMPUSTAT in the 60's and 70's, and in other non-US data sets these problems are probably more severe rather than less. Hence, the new UK data set fills an important gap. It will be useful for researchers who want to (1) investigate research questions that are sensitive to truncation of extreme observations and other forms of selection bias, (2) test theories motivated by empirical findings on US data with a credible non-US data set, or (3) examine UK data with standard methodology, such as book-to-market matching in long-horizon price performance event studies.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of potential biases inherent in accounting databases, and it provides information on the construction of the new database. Section 3 analyzes the coverage of the new database and compares it to previously available data. Section 4 investigates the reasons for missing data in the new database. Section 5 examines sample selection biases in previously existing databases. Section 6 concludes.
Sample Selection Issues
This section discusses some sample selection problems germane to databases of historical accounting information. Some of them are inherent in the data collection process. In constructing the new database I attempt to avoid them as much as possible by an appropriate set-up of the data collection process and a suitable definition of the target sample.
Selection Bias in Accounting Databases
A data set suffers from selection bias when a selection rule other than random sampling determines whether a given observation on a firm enters the database. An econometrician who ignores the inherent selection rule is implicitly conditioning on the outcome of the selection process. This may lead to biased inference. 4 From the viewpoint of financial markets research it is useful to distinguish expost and ex-ante selection biases. In the case of ex-post selection bias the selection of sample firms is based on information that was not available at the time the observation was generated. Survivor bias is a prominent form of ex-post selection bias. It exists in data sets that exclude a disproportionate share of non-surviving firms, and it arises, for example, when data is backfilled, or when data is missing prior to delisting events. By using such biased accounting information, the econometrician is implicitly conditioning on the firm's survival. Ex-post selection bias is a particularly serious concern in predictability studies, since portfolios formed on accounting data with inherent ex-post selection bias do not represent trading strategies that are replicable ex-ante. Banz and Breen (1986) , Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) , 4 For a general discussion of selection bias in panel data sets see e.g. Verbeek and Nijman (1995) . Davis (1996) , and Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2001) show that the results of empirical studies can be sensitive to this problem.
In the case of ex-ante selection bias the statistical problems may be less severe, as there is no conditioning on ex-post information. Nevertheless, it can give rise to systematic differences in characteristics between sample and population. For instance, firms in a database may be concentrated in particular size groups or industries, or data may be missing prior to initial public offerings. However, if the selection rule is known, then, despite ex-ante selection bias, any trading strategy based on accounting information that can be constructed in the data is, in principle, feasible in reality, too. This is not true for ex-post selection bias, and it makes ex-ante selection biases easier to deal with.
Sample Definition for the new UK Database
Complete coverage of the whole population is the best safeguard against selection bias. I use the master index of the London Share Price Database (LSPD) to identify all UK firms with a listing on the LSE betweeen 1955 and 1999. 5 Unfortunately, at present the LSPD does not offer price information for all firms prior to 1975. The pre-1975 price data consists of four overlapping samples, one of which is a stratified random sample covering 33% of the population at the start of the database in 1955 and 33% of all new listings each year. Despite this limitation, I collect accounting information for the full population, anticipating a potential future expansion of LSPD coverage. Considering that in many research designs share price information is matched with lagged accounting information, I set the collection start date to fiscal year 1953 to utilize the full length of LSPD coverage. When a firm has multiple share classes, they are linked to the same unit by assigning a unique issuer code to each firm. I exclude firms without official listing (Unlisted Securities Market, Alternative Investment Market etc.) and investment trusts (closed-end funds). In the following ''all firms'' or ''all listed firms'' refers to the sample just described.
Key properties of the new database
I obtain accounting data from three different sources. Data is available in electronic form from Datastream and from the Cambridge/DTI database. To supplement these sources I manually collect balance sheets from hardcopy issues of the Stock Exchange Yearbooks. This section highlights some key features and problems of each data source and describes the coverage of the new database.
Data sources
Datastream is the prime source of electronically available accounting Trade and Industry, and currently maintained at the University of Cambridge (see Whittington 1998, 1999) . The accounting information in this database was collected year by year, which means that firms were not excluded with hindsight. Hence, the data should not suffer from survivor bias. However, the data covers only a limited sample of firms, mainly in the manufacturing sector. I construct a link to this database by matching companies manually by name. In the case of duplicate codes for different firms, or Cambridge/DTI codes changing over time, I reclassify these companies by assigning my own codes. 
Handcollected data
Datastream and Cambridge/DTI offer very comprehensive accounting information, but for many firms the balance sheet provided in the Yearbook only contains a few items. However, the balance sheets are always complete in the sense that the items add up to total assets or liabilities. There are also firms for which data is provided at a greater level of detail. To keep the task manageable I categorize the data based on the minimum level of detail that is typically available for industrial companies. This classification is presented in table I, panel A. For banks I use a slightly simpler categorization, as current and non-current liabilities and assets cannot be distinguished properly based on the information given in the Yearbook. Panel B provides the outline used for banks. Appendix A discusses in more detail some of the accounting issues. Appendix B describes the checks for consistency and accuracy that were performed on the data during and following the collection process.
Coverage
This subsection examines the coverage of previously available data sets and of the new merged and supplemented database. To do this, I need to make an assumption on how the accounting information will be used. In the following I assume that book value of equity is used to form portfolios, like, for example, in Fama and French (1993) . In particular, at the end of June each year t I check whether book value of equity is available for the fiscal year ending in year t-1, where book value of equity is defined as ordinary share capital plus reserves plus total deferred and future taxation.
If data is not available in a particular year due to a fiscal year that is longer than 12 months I use the year t-2 book value. The chart shows that the sample of firms with accounting data on Datastream is quite small until the mid-70s. The merged Cambridge/DTI-Datastream sample still misses many firms. However, when the handcollected sample is added, the coverage is very close to being complete. The number of firms for which I could not find data in the Yearbooks is very small, especially if I allow the use of year t-2 accounting information in case year t-1 information is not available. 6 Missing data means that the data was not found in the handcollection process. Therefore, whether a firm-year is missing in the full database only depends on the characteristics of the handcollected sample. In general, the coverage is remarkably high compared to COMPUSTAT, where about half of CRSP firms do not have accounting data in the 1960's (Kim 1997 ).
Figure 1 also reveals an interesting difference to US data sets. The Davis, Fama, and French (2000) COMPUSTAT/Moody's data set, which is the most extensive one available for the US, provides accounting information for 834 NYSE firms in June 1956, and the sample grows to 4,562 NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms by 1996. In contrast, the new UK data set covers more than 3,000 firms in 1955, but it shrinks to less than 1,500 firms in 1999. As pointed out above, the LSPD currently does not provide share price information for all these firms in the pre-1975 period.
However, when the LSPD random sample is used, there are still about 1,000 firms in 1955 for which accounting and share price information is available.
Panel A of table 2 provides information on coverage in terms of firm-years. It
shows that the addition of the Cambridge/DTI and handcollected data extends the 6 The spike in the number of missing firms in 1969 is discussed in the next section. coverage considerably in the first two subperiods. The percentage of missing firmyears in the full database is low. Ranging from 7% to 9%, it is quite similar across subperiods. It would be very different without the handcollected data. Panel B reports the share of aggregate market capitalization that is captured by each of the subsamples. In later periods Datastream covers a relatively high share, but even in the latest subperiod the handcollected sample makes a contribution in terms of aggregate market capitalization. The fraction of market value missed by the combined database is negligible.
Examination of Missing Data
The reasons for missing data in the new database are determined by the way in which accounting information is reported in the Yearbook. Basically, the Yearbook covers all firms with official listing on the London Stock Exchange in a given year.
However, there are a few circumstances in which accounting information is not available. This section provides an investigation of these issues. To put the following discussion into perspective, however, it is important to remember that the proportion of missing observations in this database is very low -lower than in any other large database of accounting information that I am aware of.
Delistings
When a firm delists from the LSE, the issue of the Yearbook following the delisting still reports some information on this firm, but often no accounting information.
7
As a result, I frequently miss data from the fiscal year preceding the delisting. The delisting problem may be particularly relevant when firms are grouped 7 The same may happen when the trading of shares is suspended. according to size, as delistings tend to be concentrated among small firms (Kothari, Sabino, and Zach 2001, Stolin 2001 ).
The first row of table 3 shows that delistings are the reason for about 12% of firm-years that are missing in the database. More precisely, in 12% of the cases where data is missing the firm will be delisting within 18 months following the point in time when I check for data availability. Table 3 also shows that the extent to which delistings cause a missing data problem depends on the length of the lag that is allowed for accounting information. This suggests a remedy to avoid a delisting bias.
For relatively slow moving variables like book value of equity or total assets longer lags may be feasible. The second and third rows of the table show that if the use of year t-1 or t-2 accounting information is allowed, the problem is alleviated. Hence, whenever feasible, allowing longer lags is recommended to avoid delisting bias.
Another partial remedy is to apply delisting returns on the last trading day, which can be months or even years earlier than the delisting day. This also increases the chance that recent accounting information is available prior to each return observation.
Initial Listings
The manually collected sample usually misses data prior to the initial listing of a firm's stock. The Cambridge/DTI data has pre-IPO information in some, but not all cases. Datastream regularly misses the pre-listing information, too. Table 3 shows that new listings account for 28% of the firm-years with missing data. Hence, a research design that requires lagged accounting information would systematically exclude many newly listed stocks. However, this is a case of ex-ante selection bias. There is less reason for concern since there is no exclusion of firms with hindsight. For an investor trying to replicate strategies tested in the data it is always feasible to exclude firms in their first year of listing. Nevertheless, researchers should be aware of this feature of the data.
Other Reasons
In some cases the Yearbook published in year t reports the balance sheet of the fiscal year ending in year t-2, while the Yearbook in year t+1 contains the balance sheet of fiscal year t, i.e. the year t-1 data is not available. This problem is particularly present in 1969, and it is the reason for the spike in the number of missing firms observed before in figure 1. This is probably due to changes in the publication dates of the Yearbook or changes in reporting times that lead to a gap year for many firms.
As in the delisting case above, this problem can be mitigated by using lagged information from the preceding fiscal year. Figure 1 shows that when the use of year t-1 or t-2 is allowed, the spike in 1969 disappears, and the number of firms for which information is missing declines substantially.
In a few cases I may also have failed to find the information on a particular company, for example due to a failure to correctly track name changes. The occurrence of these problems is likely to be random and should have no effect on the quality of the data. Finally, in some instances available balance sheet information was not collected on purpose, for example, when denominated in foreign currency. To get some more information on how much these different reasons contribute to the missing data problem, table 4 presents a detailed analysis of missing information in the portfolio formation year 1998 (i.e. fiscal years ending in 1997). I track the reasons for missing information for each firm with missing data. In total data is missing for 79 firms. As can be seen in the table, the bulk of it can be attributed to new listings in the preceding 18 months. The rest of it is accounted for by delistings and the other reasons I discussed above. The findings in table 4 suggest that, except for the new listings problem, there is not much reason to be concerned about selection bias problems in this data.
Evidence on selection biases
The new data set with accounting data for virtually the whole population of listed firms on the LSE presents an opportunity to investigate selection bias effects in previously existing databases. It is important to note that the direction of the effects of selection biases are not clear a priori. Survivor biases are usually belived to cause an upward bias in returns, but there may also be industry, size and other biases. The total effect of these can only be determined by comparing the biased sample with the underlying population. Table 5 Datastream combined with the Cambridge/DTI database, the sample of firms tends to be biased against small firms and high book-to-market stocks. Since it is a well documented fact that these firm characteristics are associated with substantial crosssectional variation in average returns, there is reason to suspect that this selection bias could affect returns on certain portfolios and investment strategies. Furthermore, small and high book-to-market stocks are more likely to delist than other firms (Kothari, Sabino, and Zach 2001) . A bias against these firms could therefore be a symptom of survivor bias. Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2001) find that non-surviving firms tend to be either extremely bad or extremely good performers. Survivor bias implies truncation of such extreme observations. The authors show that even a small degree of such nonrandom trunction can have a strong impact on sample moments of stock returns. In table 6 I therefore examine the effects of sample selection on some important summary statistics of returns. It also applies to the widely used Datastream sample. Panel C indicates that these problems originate mainly from the period 1969-1979 when Datastream coverage is relatively poor and data has been backfilled. Summary statistics for later periods (not shown) are very similar to the full sample. All three Panels also point to an apparent 8 In return calculations I pay particular attention to delisting returns. I follow Shumway (1997) and approximate correct delisting returns by adjusting the return on the last day of trading. Shumway suggests a particular correction for CRSP NYSE stocks, based on CRSP delisting codes. Of course, I cannot apply this correction straightforwardly to the LSPD. Hence, I use my own approximation. For all delistings for which the delisting code in the LSPD suggests that the stock delisted valueless I assume a delisting return of -100%. I also check the LSPD delisting codes for a small random sample of stocks against the UK Capital Gains Tax Book, which contains information on final distributions. Based on this investigation I believe that my approximation does a good job of capturing the wealth effects experienced by an investor holding delisted stocks. Qualitatively, the results presented below are not sensitive to the approximation method. 9 Without averaging statistics across years, differences in statistics could arise from a different distribution of observations across year, coupled with statistics changing over time. 10 Datastream is compared to the full sample only for the 1969-2000 period since Datastream does not offer coverage before 1968. The first possible portfolio formation date therefore is June 1969. underestimation of mean returns when previously existing databases are used (C and/or D). The next subsection takes a closer look at this. Table 7 compares the returns on portfolios that utilize the full data set with those that result when the sample is restricted to firms covered in previously existing databases. I compute equal-weighted returns on various portfolios based on the entire database (D+C+H) and on subsamples (D+C) or (D). The raw returns, as well as the mean difference in these portfolio returns and associated t-statistics are reported in table 7. In Panel A I form a simple equal-weighted index. Panels B and C report returns on size and book-to-market portfolios, respectively. The latter portfolios are formed based on quintile breakpoints derived from the full sample (D+C+H). These full sample breakpoints are also applied to the subsample that is to be compared with the full sample, which follows the Banz and Breen (1986) Hence, it can not be attributed to a mere size bias. Interestingly, the return differences appear to originate mainly from the smallest size group. The differences related to Datastream-only size portfolios in the second set of columns all have negative signs, but they are not statistically significant. Panel C examines return differences for bookto-market portfolios. Here a clear pattern emerges. Both Datastream and the Cambridge/DTI database tend to miss some medium to high book-to-market stocks with high returns. The addition of the handcollected data significantly increases returns for book-to-market portfolios 3 and 4.
Sample selection effects on average firm characteristics

Sample selection effects on estimated moments of returns
Sample selection effects on portfolio returns
Thus, a researcher who requires accounting information for firms in his sample systematically misses some well performing stocks if she does not use the handcollected sample to supplement existing databases. Given the results above, the problem appears to be most severe for investigations that focus on very small firms, or on stocks with relatively high book-to-market ratios.
So far I compared previously existing databases (D, C) with the full database (D+C+H). The few firms still missed by the full database are not likely to cause any significant bias in returns in most research designs. However, to check this I repeat above tests, and compare the LSPD population to the sample of firms for which I have accounting information from any source (D+C+H). Differences indeed turn out to be negligible. For example, in the case of five size portfolios the differences in mean returns are all lower than half a basispoint per month. None of the differences is significant at any conventional significance level, there is no uniform pattern in signs, and they are not jointly significant.
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To conserve space I do not report the full results.
Discussion
The result that firms missed in existing databases tend to have higher mean returns may seem somewhat surprising.
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In the case of survivor bias one might expect to find those firms underperforming instead. However, the situation is more complex. First, the return implications of survivor bias are not clear a priori. Attrition of firms from exchanges not only occurs through bad performance and distress but also, for example, through takeovers and mergers. Second, survivor bias is certainly not the only form of selection bias with possible impact on returns of firms in these databases. I have presented some evidence for size and book-to-market tilts, but there are potentially many more, including industry biases, new listing biases etc.
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Perhaps more important than the mean returns evidence, depending on the research design, is the finding that existing databases miss firms that exibit performance in the tails of the return distribution. The effects on sample standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis presented here are strikingly similar to the simulation results of Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2001) where extreme observation are truncated deliberately. The evidence presented here complements their work by showing that the effects they generate in simulations do indeed arise in widely used databases.
12 Interestingly, Banz and Breen (1986) , who test for selection bias effects in a version of COMPUSTAT database that excludes firms that have disappeared, also find a higher return for stocks that are missed by the database. 13 An additional caveat is in order. It is well documented that in earlier decades many very small stocks on the London Stock Exchange feature thin trading and stale prices that can impact return statistics even at monthly frequencies (see e.g. Dimson and Marsh 1983) . These microstructure problems could be another reason for the higher return observed for stocks in the handcollected sample. For example, consider a price sequence 1, 1.05, 1.125 for a stock where trading is frequent. An otherwise similar, but thinly traded stock may have a price sequence 1, 1, 1.125. The arithmetic average return for the latter one is 6.25%, whereas it is 5% for the first one, even though the fundamental value was identical at each point in time. For this reason I also run tests where I sort stocks on trading frequency. However, it turns out that, after controlling for trading frequency, stocks in the handcollected sample still tend to have higher returns.
Conclusions
This paper introduces a new data set of accounting information for UK firms. I merge two existing databases, supplement them with handcollected data, and obtain a total of about 100,000 firm-years of key balance sheet items. The data set covers virtually all firms that have been listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1953 and 1999, and it is fully cross-referenced to the London Share Price Database. Most importantly, it is free of the selection biases commonly present in databases of accounting information.
Based on the new data set I provide evidence on the effects of selection biases in previously existing UK databases. The firms missed in these data sets tend to be small and have high book-to-market. Excluding them produces a downward bias in mean returns, particularly for medium to high book-to-market portfolios.
Furthermore, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis of monthly returns are understated. This suggests that existing databases miss extreme performers in both tails of the return distribtion. The evidence closely mirrors the simulation results in Kothari, Sabino, and Zach (2001) , where extreme observations are truncated deliberately. At least a part of these effects can be attributed to the survivor bias inherent in Datastream data until the end of the 1970's.
Whether these biases in firm characteristics and sample moments should be reason for concern depends on the research design. Particular caution is warranted when inference is sensitive to biases in second and higher moments, as, for example, in long-horizon abnormal return measurement. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the selection biases documented here are confined to UK databases. Little is known about the firms missed by COMPUSTAT in the 60's and 70's. Data sets from other countries probably suffer rather more than less from these problems. Hence, the results in this paper illustrate a general problem in databases of accounting information that researchers should be aware of.
The absence of selection bias in the new data set allows researchers to avoid these problems. Of course, the number of data items offered per firm in my handcollected sample is just a fraction of what is offered on COMPUSTAT, but even so, the data is very useful, for example, to match firms or to form portfolios based on accounting characteristics such as book-to-market ratios. By enabling researchers to apply such standard methodology, the new data set also opens a way for testing of empirically motivated models with a credible and extensive non-US data set. Hence, it helps to alleviate the problem of repeated mining of the US data.
Appendix A: Accounting Issues
In the majority of cases, categorizing the balance sheet data from the Yearbook into the outline presented in table 1 is very straightforward. However, in some cases it is less trivial and involves some judgment. This usually occurs for balance sheet items that are special to certain time periods, specific industries, or particular situations. To standardize this process as much as possible I conducted a pilot study in which I collected data for a whole cross-section of firms in one year.
This was the basis for the development of a classification scheme for all balance sheet items for which the appropriate classification is not self-evident. 14 However, some problem areas remain.
Usually the distinction between equity and liabilities is clear from the data. For this reason information on book value of equity, total assets, and leverage should be reliable. The distinction between current and non-current assets and liabilities however is not always clear. For example, some firms report current liabilities and provisions in one item. Frequently, small firms report current liabilities as their only liability item. It may be that this is the result of some simplification in reporting or in recording by the publishers of the Yearbook. Thus, the categorization into current and non-current should be regarded as rather tentative.
For banks the classification into current and non-current is particularly troublesome. I therefore do not make this distinction for banks and classify all financial assets as investments and all non-financial assets as fixed assets. Frequently, banks' reserves are merged with some liabilities accounts. Therefore, shareholders' equity of banks can be severely understated and should be interpreted with caution.
14 I am grateful to Chris Higson for working with me on this classification scheme.
Insurance companies also require some special treatment. Usually, insurance companies feature lots of different financial assets on the asset side. These are classified as investments as long as they are not labeled as fixed, other, or current. On the liability side insurance companies are very special with respect to the distinction between equity and liabilities. I classify any reserve funds as reserves and insurance funds as long-term liabilities. Apparently, starting in 1974, insurance companies were allowed to hide some of their reserves in insurance funds, which makes the task of figuring out a meaningful number for reserves basically impossible. Hence, book value of equity figures for insurance companies should also be used with caution.
Waterworks, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, only report an aggregate number for share capital and long-term debt. In this case I calculate a proxy for share capital by deducting the outstanding amounts of debentures as reported in the Yearbook from this aggregate amount. I put the total amount of debentures into long-term debt.
In general, the balance sheet provided in the Yearbook is a consolidated balance sheet. However, in some few cases foreign subsidiaries are not consolidated.
In this case I take the non-consolidated parent balance sheet as the best available approximation.
Appendix B: Tests for Consistency and Accuracy
Several test have been applied to the handcollected data to check for consistency and accuracy. Identifying data entry errors is made somewhat difficult by the fact that the data in the Yearbook is also not free from errors. During the data entry process the total sums of assets and liability side of each balance sheet were checked for consistency, with double-checking in cases of divergence. In a separate step, after completion of all data entry, all differences were scaled by book equity.
Differences that amounted to more than 50% of book equity were checked again against the Yearbook and the balance sheet was compared to preceding and subsequent balance sheets. In a few cases this process revealed previously undetected inconsistencies with the Yearbook. Most importantly however, the comparison in the time series allowed to identify cases where one balance sheet item was missing in the Yearbook (e.g. sometimes nominal capital was missing in a particular year). In cases where the difference appeared to be due to such a missing item with reasonable certainty I attributed the difference to the missing item. This left only very few differences over 50% of book value of equity.
Checks of consistency of balance sheets over time also helped to identify misidentified companies. During data entry companies were looked up in the Yearbook by their name, taken from of the LSPD master index. There are cases when companies have very similar names and data for the wrong company had been entered. By checking for increases in nominal capital from one period to the next, followed by a subsequent decrease, I filtered out suspicious cases. I then checked these cases again against the Yearbook. This method also allowed to filter for cases were the number of digits (i.e. thousands or millions) was not correct. Furthermore, it also allowed to check that the spreadsheets used for data entry had not been corrupted Reason why missing Table 4 Detailed inspection of missing accounting data for the fiscal year ending in 1997
Total is the number of firms for which accounting information for the fiscal year ending in 1997 is not available from any source. All of these firms should have been looked up in the Yearbook. The table shows the reasons for nonavailability or non-collection, obtained from double-checking the Yearbook after data collection was finished. AIM/USM refers to the alternative investment market and unlisted securities market, respectively. 
